We are currently experiencing a deepening autocratization worldwide. The analysis of this phenomenon is based on different aspects: the impact of measures to mitigate the Covid-19 pandemic, which limited the freedoms of movement achieved; the role of political repression in certain contexts, which has especially attacked dissidence; political polarization, which erodes democracy in multiparty countries, or, among other aspects, the impact of disinformation or the proliferation of coups d’état in this century (Boese et al. 2022; Sinkkonen, 2021). To this reality must be added the fragility of democratic institutions and their instrumentalization by certain political figures with the aim of staying in power, turning elections or legislatures into something merely cosmetic and supportive of the regime in question, thus eroding the plurality of positions (Sá & Sanches, 2021).
According to indexes that assess the quality of democracies, such as Freedom House or Varieties of Democracy, the African continent has a majority of “unfree regimes”, “hybrid regimes” or “electoral autocracies”. Historical factors contribute to this, as some countries have never gone through a real process of democratic opening, such as Cameroon or Angola, but more conjunctural factors also contribute to this scenario, such as the consecutive coups d’état in the Sahel region since the coup in Mali in August 2020. However, it is necessary to observe the diversity that exists when we look at authoritarian political regimes, whether civilian or military. Military coups such as that of Burkina Faso in September 2022, Niger in July 2023 or Gabon in August 2023 were greeted with considerable initial enthusiasm by the populations, unlike that of Mali (Mateos, 2023). There are cases in which attempts by presidents to stay in power for a third or fourth term are successful (in Togo, with Faure Gnassingbé, for example), unlike others, which face strong civil and political opposition (as demonstrated in 2024 by Macky Sall’s attempt to postpone elections in Senegal). Finally, there are countries whose ruling parties have not changed since their independence, regardless of whether they are democratic or authoritarian countries (Botswana and Angola, respectively), while there are others in which the opposition parties have become the ruling parties, thus promoting alternation (see the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau).
Thus, the political arena continues to be dominated by certain parties or other political actors, limiting competition and alternation in governance. Likewise, the academic literature on politics continues to focus more on incumbents and the executive branch rather than on oppositions, and the African continent is no exception (Helms, 2023). Studies on political oppositions are lacking, despite the fact that they are considered essential and necessary in democratic systems for the processes of contestation, competition and accountability (Kotzé & García-Rivero, 2008).
On the African continent, partisan opposition is restricted due to an authoritarianism that has been omnipresent since the conquests of independence (Kotzé & García-Rivero, 2008). In addition to this restriction, opposition parties lack organizational capacity and incentives and are limited in their activities. Opposition parties are often weak, with difficulties in becoming national parties and also in establishing themselves locally, making their recruitment strategies more difficult than those of parties in power (Uddhammar et al., 2011; Paget, 2022; Sjögren, 2024). This wave of autocratization has also seen an increase in protests and actions, on the streets and online, against the deterioration of the quality of representative democracy (Mateos & Erro, 2021; Sanches, 2022).
Despite this, even in a context of democratic erosion, we have witnessed a progressive gain of ground by the oppositions in some countries, including dominant party systems such as those in southern Africa, where the opposition gains ground at every electoral moment. We have also seen electoral victories of opposition candidates in certain hybrid regimes, as was the case in Liberia and Senegal in January and March 2024. In the case of Senegal, popular protests against Macky Sall’s control of democratic institutions were decisive for the victory of the PASTEF party and its candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye.
In a context of great variation in the degree of institutionalization of opposition parties, in their local and/or national deployment and in the agendas and ideologies they mobilize, and based on the premise that the study of political oppositions is essential for studies of political systems, democracies and power dynamics, this panel poses the following questions, applied to the African continent: during this growing dynamic of autocratization, how is dissent expressed and anti-government agendas mobilized? What spaces are available for opposition action? How do the opposition parties act? What agendas for democracy and democratization are proposed? How do you connect with citizens, political protest movements or political activism that is not part of political parties? What novelties and continuities do phenomena such as PASTEF in Senegal bring and what implications does it have for the democratic reality of African countries?
Based on these questions, the main objectives of the panel are to explain the mobilization, action and agenda proposal strategies of opposition political parties and to map the interaction between opposition parties and citizens and activists.
The panel thus aims to respond to gaps in the literature on opposition politics in Africa. It is open to proposals based on case studies and comparative studies that focus on the issues of formation, mobilization and institutional performance of opposition parties, especially focusing on competitive authoritarian regimes that have institutions with elected representatives. Papers from different disciplines and interdisciplinary perspectives in African Studies are welcome.
